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I. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign investment is developing a social conscience.  There are three 
developments that herald this movement.  The first is the expanding body of 
case law arising from arbitral tribunals, the jurisdiction of which is based on 
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Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)1 or 
an arbitration clause in a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”), and which is 
coming to terms with new perceptions about the multilateral regulation of 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”).  While investment instruments are 
traditionally geared towards the protection of investors and investment, 
many of them now contain a quid pro quo, calling for standards of corporate 
social responsibility.2  Much of this thinking has arisen in the context of 
recent arbitration, which is predicated upon claims arising out of the breach 
of property rights or investor standards, but is increasingly challenged by 
the right of host States to regulate in the fields of social and cultural policy 
or environmental protection.  It has led to the appearance of a new 
generation of “model” BITs spearheaded by the governments of the United 
States and Canada, which seek to regulate these competing interests through 
the negotiation of social and environmental clauses in their treaty-making 
practice. 
A second related development is the introduction of broader social and 
environmental justice issues by civil society organizations (“CSOs”) before 
international arbitral tribunals by means of amicus curiae briefs.  While it is 
still at the discretion of an arbitral tribunal to determine whether it will 
entertain such briefs, there is evidence of their increased use in practice.  
This trend is set to expand in international investment arbitration.  The 2003 
Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party 
Participation under NAFTA3 and the amendment in 2006 to the World 
Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”)4 Rules on Arbitration Proceedings5 open the way for CSOs to 
make submissions to arbitral tribunals on a range of social and societal 
issues.  These new rules on greater transparency and participation by non-
parties to an investment dispute are finding their way into several model 
BITs, and other governments may in the future feel compelled to include 
similar clauses in their investment treaties. 
A third development, which is slowly gaining ground, is the introduction 
of a more tenable link between business and human rights into investment 
treaty instruments.  This development has come about as a result of the 
  
 1. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 2. Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 3, 37 (Peter Muchlinski, et. al.  eds., 2008). 
 3. See generally NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade 
Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation, Oct. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov [hereinafter NAFTA FTC Statement]. 
 4. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,  575 U.N.T.S. 159, as amended 
through Apr. 10, 2006 [hereinafter ICSID]. 
 5. ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, 99, April 2006, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.js [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration 
Rules]. 
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work of John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises,6 who is seeking to define the relationship of 
corporations to human rights.  There have been earlier attempts to hold 
transnational corporations (“TNCs”) accountable for standards of minimum 
social and environmental protection in the jurisdictions in which they 
operate.  This has been done mostly through voluntary, non-binding codes 
of conduct, such as the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) with its 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles on Multinationals and Social Policy,7 the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,8 and the UN Global 
Compact,9 the latter of which advocates ten universally accepted principles 
in the areas of human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption. 
A significant factor in this respect is that some model BITs aim to 
incorporate by reference, these ‘soft’ law norms into their treaty 
instruments.  But to what extent, if at all, are such putative corporate social 
responsibility clauses enforceable, and what do they mean for international 
firms seeking to invest overseas?  Going a step further is it possible that an 
instrument like the abortive U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights10 or a set of mutually agreed principles or guidelines on the 
relationship of corporations to fundamental human rights could resonate 
with treaty-making in the field of foreign investment? 
Drawing upon the recent practice of claimants and respondents before 
international investment tribunals, I examine the extent to which BITs and 
other international investment agreements (“IIAs”) have (a) followed up on 
the substantive implications arising from those decisions in the fields of 
  
 6. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the Human Rights Council, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009), (prepared by John Ruggie) (following up on his earlier 
report, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights to the 
HRC, A/HRC/8/5 (2008)) [hereinafter Ruggie, U.N. Framework]. 
 7. International Labour Organisation [ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles on 
Multinationals and Social Policy, 61 ILO Official Bull. Series A No. 1 (1978) available at 
http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/triparti.htm [hereinafter ILO 
Tripartite Declaration] (adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at 
its 204th Session in Geneva). 
 8. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, June 27, 2000, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
investment/guidelines [hereinafter OECD Guidelines 2000]. 
 9. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the Global Compact at the 
World Economic Forum at its 1999 meeting in Dais.  It was formally launched on Jul. 26, 
2000, available at http://unglobalcompact.org [hereinafter UN Global Compact]. 
 10. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Promotion and Prot. of 
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 
(Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter UN Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs]. 
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social and environmental protection, and have (b) introduced procedural 
innovations, securing non-disputing party rights before investment 
arbitration tribunals.  A number of questions arise.  (1) Do the new 
generation of model BITs and other forms of IIAs potentially support or 
hamper competing goals and policies in the fields of social and cultural 
policy or environmental protection?  (2) To what extent is the right of the 
host States to regulate in such matters given recognition comparable to that 
of the investor? 
This Article is divided into three further sections, each of which 
addresses the developments mentioned in the introduction, and is followed 
by a final section, which contains some conclusions. 
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION VERSUS SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
In the past decade, there has been an explosion of BITs, and other forms 
of IIAs, for the promotion and protection of foreign investment.  The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”),11 which 
actively monitors and analizes all forms of IIAs, has estimated the number 
of BITs to be 2,608 as of mid-June 2008.12  It also notes that 179 states are 
now a contracting party to at least one BIT, while many others, such as the 
United States and Germany, are party to a significant number of BITs.  Both 
the United States and Germany, as well as Canada, China, France, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom, have developed a new generation of model 
BITs,13 which they are using in investor-state relations for the regulation of 
foreign investment globally.  Some of the newer BITs reflect a growing 
trend on the part of governments to negotiate new agreements or to re-
negotiate older ones, in order to reflect concerns about social and 
environmental issues, including the host state’s right to regulate in these 
matters.14  
  
 11. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was 
established on Dec. 8, 1962, and it became an official organ of the UN General Assembly on 
December 30, 1964.  See G.A. Res. 1785, ¶ 1, U.N. GOAR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 8,, 1962); G.A. Res. 1995, UN GOAR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 
1, U.N. Doc. A/5818 (Dec. 30, 1964). 
 12. ECOSOC, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2007 – 
2008), IIA MONITOR 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2008/1 (2008) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD IIA Monitor 2008].  
 13. For some recent model BITs of the Governments of China, France, Germany, the 
UK and the US respectively, see the Annexes in Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 352, 360, 368, 376, 385 (2008). 
 14. UNCTAD IIA Monitor 2008, supra note 12, at 5. 
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A. Trends in First and Second Generation Investment Instruments 
The political will of governments during the negotiation and adoption of 
BITs directly affects the extent to which host state responsibilities will be 
balanced by corporate social responsibility provisions directed at the 
investor or the investment.  Many existing BITs are of the first generation, 
concluding somewhere between 195915 and the early 1990s.  By and large 
they reflect the demands of the major capital-exporting states in the 
developed, industrialized world, which were previously situated in the 
Northern hemisphere.  An almost exclusive emphasis on the protection of 
the foreign investment was served by the conclusion of BITs that provided 
for the substantive protection and promotion of investment.16  Basic 
treatment guarantees against the discriminatory, unfair, and expropriable 
conduct of host states.17  Notwithstanding rapid developments in the field of 
investment treaty-making, the majority of these early BITs are still in force 
and usually form the basis for the settlement of investment disputes. 
A second, “newer” generation of BITs and other IIAs either contain 
individual investment chapters, have separate protocols on investment 
attached to them, or include substantive provisions on investment protection 
and liberalization.18  They embrace regional agreements like NAFTA,19 
MERCOSUR,20 or ASEAN,21 or sectoral investment agreements like the 
  
 15. Germany entered into the first modern bilateral investment treaty with Pakistan 
in 1959; see Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Nov. 25, 
1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 23 (entered into force Apr. 28, 1962). 
 16. Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 681 (Peter Muchlinski, et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
Corporate Social Responsibility]. 
 17. Federico Ortino, The Social Dimension of International Investment Agreements: 
Draft a New BIT/MIT Model? 7 INT’L L. FORUM DU DROIT INT’L 243, 243 (2005). 
 18. UNCTAD, Systemic Issues in International Investment Agreements (IIAs), 2, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/2 (2006). 
 19. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1. 
 20. Tratado para la constitución de un Mercado Comun entre la República Argentina 
[MERCOSUR], la República Federativa del Brasil, la República del Paraguay y la República 
Oriental del Uruguay [Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic 
of Uruguay], Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/agreemts/Mercin_e.asp#MERCOSUR.  A specific instrument on 
investment, known as the Colonia Protocol on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments in Mercosur, which provides BIT-like protection to MERCOSUR member 
nations, was signed on Jan. 17, 1994; however, it is not yet in force.  See Protocolo de 
Colonia para la promoción y protección reciproca de inversions en el MERCOSUR [Colonia 
Protocol for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR], 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 11/93 (Jan. 17, 1994), available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org.trade.mrcsrs/decisions/DEC1193.asp.  It was followed by the 
Buenos Aires Protocol on the Promotion and Protection of Investments made by Countries 
that are not Parties to the MERCOSUR, which was signed on Aug. 5, 1994; however, it is 
not yet in force.  See Protocol on Promotion and Protection of Investments Coming from 
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Energy Charter Treaty.22  Many of these IIAs, including the newer BITs, 
build on the first generation of investment treaties but place more emphasis 
on the liberalization of investment, as there is a reduction of market access 
barriers.  The principal aim of these IIAs is the promotion of economic 
growth among the states that are parties to them. 
Some of the IIAs, like the NAFTA or the Energy Charter Treaty, offer 
strong investor protection standards and internationalized dispute 
settlement.  Other IIAs, like the various ASEAN investment instruments, 
are pure market access instruments, which have more in common with 
modern trade agreements and specialised instruments on trade in services.  
A feature of NAFTA is its more holistic approach to trade and the 
regulation of foreign investment, as evidenced by the preambular text to the 
treaty, which seeks inter alia to “promote sustainable development; and 
protect, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights.”23  Two additional 
agreements to NAFTA, on specific social issues in the fields of 
environmental24 and labor25 cooperation, endorse this approach.  The North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC”) and the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”) came into 
existence after intense lobbying by environmental groups and labor unions, 
who were worried about inadequate environmental protection and trade 
union representation in Mexico.  In practice, civil society organizations 
  
Non-MERCOSUR State Parties, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. No. 11/94 (Aug. 5, 1994); see 
also ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 
1, 50–51 (2009). 
 21. Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore & the 
Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987, 27 
I.L.M. 612; Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of 
Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the 
Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand & the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam Establishing a Framework Agreement on the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA), Oct. 7, 1998, 39 I.L.M. 708.  Both have been superseded by the 
Agreement Between the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the 
Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of 
Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of 
Thailand & the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Member States of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), known as the Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA), Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.aseansec.org/22219.htm (not yet in force). 
 22. The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 381 (1995), reprinted in 
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY COOPERATION (Energy Charter Secretariat ed., 2004).  
 23. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Preamble; see also Ortino, supra note 17, 245–246 
(concerning the importance of the preambular text of treaty instruments because they provide 
the relative contextual basis for interpreting substantive treaty provisions). 
 24. See generally North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480. 
 25. See generally North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1547 [hereinafter NAALC]. 
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(“CSOs”) have considered the NAAEC and the NAALC to be “weak and 
ineffectual”.26  Instead, there is an increased emphasis on raising social and 
environmental issues before investment tribunals, which is the topic that I 
will turn to next. 
B. Towards Social and Environmental Protection Through 
Investment Arbitration 
The most recent generation of IIAs has arisen largely as a result of two 
developments.  One of those developments is the burgeoning case law under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 concerning regulatory and environmental ‘takings.’  In 
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada,27 a U.S. corporation, which was the sole 
manufacturer in Canada of the manganese-based gasoline additive 
(“MMT”), challenged a Canadian statute28 banning inter-provincial and 
international import of MMT as a pollutant and harmful to human health.  
The arbitral tribunal’s award on jurisdiction raised concerns as to whether 
regulatory measures in the field of the environment, public health, and other 
social issues could possibly amount to compensable takings under the 
relevant treaty provisions.29  This would effectively interfere with the right 
of a host state, such as Canada, to regulate in the public interest.30 
A domestic challenge by four Canadian provinces,31 under Canada’s 
Agreement on Internal Trade (“AIT”),32 led the panel33 to find the Canadian 
Statute to be invalid because it constituted an undue burden on Canada’s 
internal commerce.34  Meanwhile, the Canadian Government settled the 
  
 26. Rajib N. Sanyal, The Social Clause in Trade Treaties: Implications for 
International Firms, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 381 (2001). 
 27. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708, (NAFTA Ch. 11 
Arb. Trib. 1998),  [hereinafter Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction]. 
 28. The Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act, 1997 banned the importation or inter-
provincial sale of methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT), an octane booster, 
which when added to gasoline enhances fuel efficiency.  The Act left local sales of MMT in 
Canada undisturbed.  Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act [MBFAA], 1997 S.C., ch. 11 
(Can.). 
 29. Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 27. 
 30. See  M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 293 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 31. The four relevant Canadian provinces are Alberta, Québec, Nova Scotia, and 
Saskatchewan. 
 32. Agreement on Internal Trade, July 18, 1994, Can., available at 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ait-aci.nsf/eng/home. 
 33. Agreement on International Trade, Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning 
the Dispute Between Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives 
Act, (June 12, 1998),   http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/dispute.htm (Governments of Québec, 
Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan intervening as co-complainants). 
 34. See Sanford E. Gaines, Protecting Investors, Protecting the Environment: The 
Unexpected Story of Chapter 11 in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 173, 182–83 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 
2003). 
40 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:1 
NAFTA claim by agreeing to rescind the MMT ban and pay Ethyl $13 
million, which was considered to be the reasonable cost of the dispute and 
Ethyl’s lost profits in Canada.  Canada also took the unprecedented step of 
issuing a statement that there was no scientific basis for banning MMT on 
either environmental or health grounds. 
Contrary to the decision in Ethyl, the Arbitral Tribunal in Methanex 
Corporation v. United States35 found that a California state ban on the 
manufacturing and sale of the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(“MTBE”), did not amount to expropriation, nor was it compensable.36  This 
was based on the Tribunal’s findings that the measure was non-
discriminatory, that it had been adopted for a public purpose, and that it was 
in accordance with due process.  Moreover, no specific commitments had 
been given to the putative foreign investor, and therefore, no legitimate 
expectations had been created upon which the Methanex Corporation could 
rely.37 
While this form of regulatory taking,38 or indirect expropriation, may 
potentially deprive the investor of utilizing the investment in a meaningful 
way, it allows the state to give effect to environmental and societal concerns 
while avoiding the payment of compensation.  Not only is this an 
unattractive proposition for some investors, but it may also have a 
detrimental effect on some host state governments.  Some states may feel 
that the regulation of foreign investment by BITs and other IIAs limits their 
national policy space by hindering their right to regulate for social or 
environmental purposes.  At the same time those same states do not wish to 
put off potential foreign investors with burdensome regulation.  Moreover, 
there are uncertainties surrounding what constitutes a regulatory taking, and 
which takings are non-compensable or compensable.  
This is not considering the effect of various, sometimes inconsistent, 
investment arbitration awards.  In particular, those awards that pit investor 
protection standards against the right of the host state to regulate in order to 
ensure provision of essential public services or to deal with the effects of a 
particular economic crisis are arguably the most sensitive.  The Argentinean 
economic and financial crisis of 2001–2002 is particularly instructive in this 
respect.  It  has given rise to more than forty-three ICSID proceedings 
instituted under relevant BITs as to which Argentina is a party,  which 
resulted in liabilities for Argentina conservatively estimated at around $8 
  
 35. See generally 44 I.L.M. 1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005). 
 36. Id. pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 6. 
 37. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13, at 110. 
 38. A regulatory taking in some jurisdictions is equated with takings of property that 
fall within the police powers of the State.  See generally UNCTAD, Taking of Property, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (2000); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 29, at 353–354. 
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billion, although others estimate the potential claims to be around $80 
billion.39 
However, it is the cases of government interference with an investment 
involving the operation of public services — mostly in the utilities sector 
such as water, sanitation, or power — that have struck a chord in some 
investor-host state relations.  For example, in the case of Aguas del Tunari 
v. Bolivia,40 brought under the Netherlands/Bolivia BIT, widespread popular 
protests followed the privatization of water services in the City of 
Cochabamba, including the grant of a 40-year concession to Aguas del 
Tunari (a subsidiary of the US corporation Bechtel) and a sharp increase in 
water prices.  The investor abandoned its concession in 2000 and filed for 
compensation under ICSID.  An “out of court” settlement left Bechtel being 
paid only nominal compensation. 
Other investment disputes under BITs that have generated considerable 
public interest include two cases involving the Government of Argentina’s 
decision to abandon the pegging of the peso to the dollar and to freeze rates 
in the water sector.  One dispute was Suez/InterAguas v. Argentina,41 and 
the second dispute was Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina.42 These disputes were 
brought under the Spain/Argentina and France/Argentina BITs respectively.  
Similarly, privatization of the water industry and subsequent cancellation of 
the investor’s concession to supply water to the country’s capital Dar-es-
Salaam was at issue in the case of Biwater v. Tanzania,43 brought under the 
UK/Tanzania BIT.  As is evident from the amicus curiae briefs that were 
filed before the relevant tribunals in all three disputes, and which are 
discussed in the next section, the arbitral tribunals were encouraged to 
balance the interests of the foreign investor against the right of the host state 
to legitimately regulate on environmental and public health grounds. 
When it comes to regulatory takings and indirect expropriation, NAFTA 
tribunals, as well as other arbitral tribunals constituted on the basis of 
BITs,44 have begun to apply some differentiation.  While each claim must 
be judged on its own individual merits, investment arbitration tribunals are 
applying certain criteria.  The tribunals look at whether the investor has 
suffered “substantial deprivation”, the effect of the expropriatary measure, 
  
 39. William Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under 
BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 199, 204 (2008). 
 40. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 20 ICSID REV. 450 (ICSID Arb. Trib.  2005) [hereinafter Aguas del Tunari, 
Decision on Jurisdiction]. 
 41. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2004) [hereinafter 
Suez/InterAguas]. 
 42. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2004) [hereinafter Suez/Vivendi]. 
 43. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Rep. of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 
(ICSID Arb. Trib. 2008) [hereinafter Biwater Gauff]. 
 44. For example, other cases arose out of the Argentinean economic crisis under 
various BITs.  See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Rep., 47 I.L.M. 445 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2007); 
LG & E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Rep., 46 I.L.M. 36 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2006). 
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the duration of the investment, whether the investor has retained “continued 
control” over the enterprise, and the legitimate expectations of the 
investor.45 
In practice, the effect of this exercise is that tribunals are striving to 
reach a balance between the right of the investor to derive protection from 
specific treaty standards, and the right of the host state to act in the public 
interest.  As the NAFTA Tribunal in Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States46 
remarked, when considering a claim of indirect expropriation of an open-pit 
mine on environmental and cultural policy grounds, its award was important 
for the “private and public entities concerned with environmental 
regulation, [and] the interests of indigenous peoples.”  However, the 
Tribunal also noted “the tension . . . between private rights in property and 
the need of the State to regulate the use of property.”47 
C.  “Modeling” Social and Environmental Protection Clauses in Third 
Generation Investment Instruments 
It is becoming increasingly common for states to expand on their 
legitimate right to regulate for social or environmental purposes by 
imposing restrictions in one of two ways.  One is for governments to 
provide exceptions to the general prohibition on the imposition of 
performance requirements in many IIAs.  For example, Article 1106 of 
NAFTA outlaws performance requirements but permits measures where 
they are “necessary” for the protection of the environment; they are for 
reasons of human, animal, or plant health and safety; or they are related to 
the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources.48 
The second condition for the application of such measures by the host state 
is that it must not be “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable,” nor must it “constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade or investment.”49 
This wording is drawn from the preamble, or chapeau, to Article XX of 
the GATT 1994.50  It implies that the host state’s discretion in applying such 
measures will be subject to a series of tests.  When it comes to a measure 
that is “necessary” for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or 
health, the host state government adopting the measure will have to 
demonstrate that the BIT-inconsistent measure is reasonably available given 
  
 45. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13, 96–115. 
 46. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Final Award (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2009),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Glamis Gold]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1106(6). 
 49. Id. 
 50. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (adopting The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, 
55 U.N.T.S. 187).  
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the objective to be sought, i.e. reasonably necessary and proportionate to the 
aim.51 
Similarly, a host state government adopting a measure for the 
conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources will 
have to show that the BIT-inconsistent measure is “reasonably related” to 
the objective of the measure.  It will also have to demonstrate that the 
investment measure is “primarily aimed” at conservation.52  GATT and 
WTO case law requires that there is “a genuine relationship of ends and 
means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue.”53  What is 
evident is that any treaty interpreter, including an arbitrator, will be called 
upon to balance the right of the host state to invoke the exception and its 
obligation to respect the rights of other states and their 
investors/investments, under the relevant IIA. 
The other means of restriction, which is common to some third 
generation BITs, is a so-called “non-lowering of standards” clause.  Such a 
provision aims to suppress the temptation of host states to lower their 
environmental or labour standards as an incentive to attract foreign 
investment.  It is intended to respond to the “pollution haven” hypothesis 
and the phenomenon of “social dumping”; whereby, the host state seeks to 
attract foreign investment that is environmentally damaging or fails to 
address violations of fundamental labour standards, and subsequently 
lowers its environmental or labour standards as an inducement to inward 
investment.54  An example of this is found at Article 1114(2) of NAFTA,55 
which is a non-binding “best efforts” approach to a “non-lowering of 
standards” on environmental protection.  It recognizes that it is 
“inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety 
or environmental measures.” 
The U.S. Model BIT,56 the Canadian Model FIPA,57 as well as the draft 
Norwegian Model BIT,58 reflect both trends.  For example the U.S. Model 
  
 51. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 16, at 637, 670–71.  
 52. Panel Report, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, ¶ 4.6, L/6268 (Nov. 20, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 
(1989). 
 53. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
¶ 145, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 17, 2007). 
 54. Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 16, at 671. 
 55. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(2). 
 56. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (2004), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/c644.htm [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT (2004)]. 
 57. Canada’s model bilateral investment treaty is known as a Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement or FIPA.  See Canada’s Foreign Investment Protection 
and Promotion Agreement Model, 2003, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx [hereinafter Canadian Model FIPA 
(2003)]. 
 58. Norway’s Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
2007,www.regjeringen.no/upload/.../Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc [hereinafter 
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BIT, besides providing exceptions to the prohibition on performance 
requirements on environmental grounds in Article 8(3)(c),59 also 
incorporates two “non-lowering of standards” provisions.   The language in 
Article 12 on “Investment and Environment” and in Article 13 on 
“Investment and Labor” is more strident than in Article 1114(2) of NAFTA.  
Paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the U.S. Model BIT states, with respect to 
protection offered by domestic environmental law, that “each Party shall 
strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, . . .  such 
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those 
laws as encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or 
retention of an investment in its territory.”60 
There is a repetition of this text in paragraph 1 of Article 13 concerning 
domestic labor laws, with the additional requirement that each party must 
not derogate from its domestic labor laws in a manner that “weakens or 
reduces adherence to the internationally recognized labor rights referred to 
in paragraph 2.”61  The “internationally recognized labor rights” are 
specifically listed in the second paragraph of Article 13 as: 
 
(a) the right of association;  
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;  
(d) labor protections for children and young people, including a minimum 
age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination 
of the worst forms of discrimination; and  
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health.62 
 
  
Norwegian Model BIT (2007)]. Following critical public comments, the Government of 
Norway subsequently withdrew the Norwegian Model BIT 2007 in June, 2009; see Damon 
Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INV. TREATY 
NEWS, June 8, 2009, available at http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive 
/2009/08/08; see SOUTH CENTRE, COMMENTS ON NORWAY’S DRAFT MODEL BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY (BIT): POTENTIALLY DIMINISHING THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY SPACE OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTNERS 3 (2008), http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&task=view&id=942&Itemid=77 [hereinafter South Centre comment, 2008]. 
 59. U.S. Model BIT (2004), supra note 56, art. VIII, ¶ 3. 
 60. Id. at art. XII, ¶ 1. 
 61. Id. at art. XIII, ¶ 1. 
 62. These internationally recognized labor rights have all been endorsed in the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, June 18, 
1998,  37 I.L.M. 1233  [hereinafter ILO Declaration 1998] (adopted by the International 
Labour Conference at its 86th Session in Geneva).  Only the final requirements in Art. 
13(2)(e) of the U.S. Model BIT, concerning minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health, fall outside of the ILO Declaration 1998.  See also NAALC, 
supra note 25, art. 1(2) (referencing the Labor Principles in ¶¶ 6, 9, 10 of the NAALC’s 
Annex 1, which also concern the issues of minimum wage and occupational safety and 
health).  Related provisions have been emphasized in many other modern international 
agreements and model BITs. 
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These two “non-lowering of standards” clauses in respect of 
environmental protection and labour standards have already been 
incorporated into the U.S./Uruguay BIT.63 
The draft Norwegian Model BIT contains a “General Exceptions” 
provision in Article 24,64 which is modeled on Article XX of GATT, and 
similar language in the U.S. and Canadian Model BITs.  It is not 
specifically linked to exceptions concerning the prohibition on performance 
requirements, such as the one found in the second paragraph of Article 8, 
which relates to “[a] measure that requires an investment to use a 
technology to meet generally applicable health, safety or environmental 
requirements.”65  In fact, Article 24 is horizontal in character, such that it 
could operate as an exception not only for performance requirements but 
also with respect to any obligation, including the protection of investor 
standards under the Model BIT.  The draft Norwegian Model BIT also 
provides for a separate cultural exception in Article 27, which is “designed 
to preserve and promote linguistic and cultural diversity, cultural and 
audiovisual policy.”66  However, when it comes to the “non-lowering of 
standards”, paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Model BIT states that “it is 
inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety 
or environmental and core labour standards.”67  The next sentence is 
modeled almost verbatim on a similar provision in Article 1114(2) of 
NAFTA and the model BITs of Canada68 and the U.S., besides being 
strongly reminiscent of the former negotiating text of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment.69  It stipulates that “a Party should not waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion 
or retention of an investment of an investor.”70 
  
 63. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. XII & XIII, Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-9, 44 I.L.M. 
268, 278 [hereinafter US/Uruguay BIT, 2005]; see also Corporate Social Responsibility, 
supra note 16, at 653 (noting “‘no lowering of standards’ clauses concerning labour rights in 
US BITs”). 
 64. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra  note 58, art. 24. 
 65.  Id. art. 8(2). 
 66.  Id. art. 27. 
 67.  Id. art. 11(1). 
 68. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(2); see also U.S. Model BIT (2004), supra 
note 56, arts. XII & XIII. 
 69. The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) (1995–1998) was 
negotiated under the auspices of the OECD but abandoned in 1998.  During the negotiating 
phase some delegations had proposed appending the OECD Declaration and Decisions on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.  OECD Guidelines 2000, supra note 
8. The text and commentary are present at The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Apr. 
22, 1998, OECD Doc. No. DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/htm/2.htm. 
 70. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra note 58, art. 11(1), at 10. 
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Given that many countries have a large number of BITs, which are 
nearing their expiry date and need to be renegotiated or replaced by more 
modern forms of investment treaty,71 we may expect similar changes from 
other major capital exporting countries, although the trend has not been 
followed by all governments, as is clear from the case of Germany.72  
However, generally speaking, it is clear that many of these third generation 
agreements are striving to reflect a better balance between the rights of 
investors on the one hand and the right of the host state to regulate where 
there are legitimate public concerns related to social, environmental, health, 
and safety issues. 
III. LINKING SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE TO FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT: FROM A NOISE TO A SIGNAL 
Historically, there has not been a role for amicus curiae briefs in 
international investment arbitration, which has placed much emphasis on 
the privity of parties and the consensual nature of arbitration.73  However, 
things are changing with a growing trend towards acceptance by investment 
arbitration tribunals of amicus curiae briefs, and the extension of non-
disputing party rights in the matter of access to documents and the arbitral 
proceeding, particularly where there are sensitive matters of public interest 
about which an arbitral tribunal may know very little.  It is against this 
background that I map the growing trend towards the acceptance of amicus 
curiae briefs, and other non-disputing party rights before investment 
arbitration tribunals, and examine the current status of case law on the 
matter. 
It is my contention that the issue of social and environmental justice has 
moved beyond the noise of amici and has been received as a signal by a 
number of governments.74  This has happened as a result of an increased 
  
 71. For example, just under a quarter of the 44 new BITs signed in 2007 replaced 
earlier treaties.  See UNCTAD IIA Monitor 2008, supra note 12, at 5. 
 72. German Model Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, 2008, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm.  The situation with 
respect to EU Member States is somewhat complicated and is currently under review.  This 
is because now that the Lisbon Treaty has come into force on 1 December 2009, the 
European Commission will in the future occupy the field in investment treaty-making.  It has 
already given rise to the development of a first generation of European Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements (“EIPAs”), which may come to replace many of the 
existing BITs of Member States upon their expiry. 
 73. Eduardo Savarese, Amicus Curiae Participation in Investor-State Arbitral 
Proceedings, 17 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 99, 103 (2007) (noting fn. 17 at 103, concerning the 
tribunal’s decision in Aguas del Tunari not to admit amicus curiae submissions);  Aguas del 
Tunari, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 40, ¶ 17. 
 74. The idea of a “noise” and a “signal” has been seen as the means by which social 
justice issues are moved from simply representing the voice of public concern to being 
mooted before courts and tribunals, where they can no longer be ignored.  See also Robyn 
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willingness on the part of investment arbitration tribunals to grant non-
disputing party rights to CSOs and other non-state actors.  The move has 
been bolstered by the issuance of the NAFTA FTC Statement in 2003, 
concerning non-disputing party participation in Chapter 11 investment 
arbitration.75  This was followed three years later by an amendment to the 
ICSID Rules in 2006,76 which henceforth allow for the filing of amicus 
curiae briefs before ICSID arbitral tribunals.  Subsequently, Canada, the 
United States, and Norway each have chosen to incorporate direct reference 
to the rights of non-disputing parties in their model BITs.77 
A. Non-Disputing Party Participation in NAFTA Investment 
Arbitration 
The story starts in North America with the Methanex case, a NAFTA 
Chapter 11 dispute involving a Canadian investor against the United States, 
which we came across in the previous section.  The Tribunal in Methanex, 
at the jurisdictional stage, when applying Article 15 of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules,78concluded that it had the discretionary power to accept 
an amicus curiae submission79 from the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (“IISD”) and a joint submission from the 
Commission for a Better Environment, the Bluewater Network of Earth 
Island Institute, and the Center for International Environmental Law 
(“Communities/Bluewater/Center petition”).80  However, at the 
jurisdictional stage, it decided that it did not have the power to authorize 
access to materials or to allow the petitioners to attend the hearings at this 
stage.81 
  
Eckersley, A Green Public Sphere in the WTO?: The Amicus Curiae Interventions in the 
Transatlantic Biotech Dispute, 13 EUR. J. INT’L RELS. 329, 337 (2007). 
 75. NAFTA FTC Statement 2003, supra note 3, § A, ¶¶ 1-3 (setting out the rationale 
behind non-disputing party participation, i.e. that the NAFTA itself does not “[limit] a 
Tribunal’s discretion to accept written submissions from [a non-disputing party]” nor does it 
in any way “[prejudice] the rights of NAFTA parties under Article 1128 of the NAFTA.”). 
 76. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 5. 
 77. See generally Savarese, supra note 73; Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party 
Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 REV. OF EUR. 
CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 230, 230–42 (2007). 
 78. G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 15(1), U.N. Doc. A/Res/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), 15 I.L.M. 
701 (allowing an arbitral tribunal to conduct proceedings in the manner it considers 
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated equally) [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 1976]. 
 79. See generally Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to intervene as Amici Curiae (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001) 
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecision 
ReAuthorityAmicus.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Amicus Curiae Order 2001]. 
 80. Savarese, supra note 73, at 101. 
 81. Methanex Amicus Curiae Order 2001, supra note 79, ¶¶ 47–53; see Howard 
Mann, Opening the Doors, at Least a Little: Comment on the Amicus Decision in Methanex 
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Almost contemporaneous with Methanex is the decision by another 
NAFTA investment tribunal, also operating under UNCITRAL Arbitral 
Rules, to allow amicus curiae intervention at the jurisdictional stage in UPS 
v. Canada, with the hearings being made open to the public before 
Methanex.82  In this NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute, UPS, a U.S. corporation, 
alleged discrimination by its competitor, Canada Post, which used its 
monopoly over the delivery of posted letters to run a courier service that 
allowed it to collect parcels from post offices.  UPS was denied the 
opportunity to operate a similar courier service to compete with Canada 
Post.  The Tribunal accepted amicus submissions on behalf of a joint 
submission by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (“CUPW”) and the 
Council of Canadians.83  The Amicus Curiae Petitioners argued against a 
potential breach of the minimum treatment standard in Article 1105 of 
NAFTA, calling upon the Tribunal to dismiss UPS’s claims of alleged 
unfair competition between it and Canada Post.  They claimed that the use 
of Canada Post was as a result of the lower costs of the Canadian postal 
workers, who allegedly did not enjoy the same collective bargaining powers 
as UPS employees.   
Both the Methanex  and UPS decisions, at the earlier jurisdictional phase, 
pre-date and anticipate the NAFTA FTC Statement, which besides 
stipulating who can intervene as a non-disputing party before an arbitral 
tribunal in NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings,84 includes guidelines for the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs.  The Statement suggests how a Chapter 
11 Tribunal should exercise its discretionary power in deciding whether to 
grant leave to file a non-disputing party submission.  It should consider “the 
extent to which:”  
 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from 
that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address matters within the scope 
of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and  
(d) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration.85 
  
v. United States, 10 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L.  241, 241–45 (2001) (describing 
how the Methanex Tribunal arrived at its decision). 
 82. UPS, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), 
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com. 
 83. UPS, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction: Decision on Petition for 
Intervention and Participation as Amicus Curiae (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.  2001), available 
at http://naftaclaims,com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmici 
Curiae.pdf. 
 84. NAFTA FTC Statement 2003, supra note 3, §B, ¶¶ 1–10 (setting out procedures 
for non-disputing party participation before Chapter 11 investment tribunals). 
 85. Id. § B, ¶ 6.  
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Soon after the NAFTA FTC Statement was issued, the claimant, 
Methanex Corporation, wrote to the Tribunal on behalf of both disputing 
parties, suggesting that it adopt the NAFTA FTC Statement guidelines for 
the acceptance of amicus submissions,86 which it did.  Consequently, six 
months later, in March, 2004, the first amicus curiae filings on the merits in 
Methanex were received by the Tribunal from IISD and the 
Communities/Bluewater/Center, filed on their behalf by Earthjustice.  
Acting on the NAFTA FTC Statement 2003, the Tribunal, at the merits 
stage, also provided access to documentation and allowed the amici to be 
present during the oral hearing, although it did not allow the amici to make 
any oral statement themselves.87 
Ultimately the effect of the amici on the substance of the dispute in the 
final Methanex award on the jurisdiction and merits is questionable, given 
that the Tribunal made little express reference to the Petitioners’ 
submissions.88  Where it did, it chose to highlight the procedural aspects of 
the non-disputing parties’ participation in the dispute.89  The tribunal did, 
however, endorse the arguments advanced by IISD concerning the notion 
that trade law approaches cannot simply be transferred to the arena of 
international investment law.90  Similarly, in the Final UPS Award91 the 
Tribunal chose to make no mention whatsoever of the non-disputing parties’ 
participation, including their previously accepted amicus curiae briefs. 
A rather different approach is evident in Glamis Gold92 where Glamis 
Gold, Ltd., a publicly-held Canadian corporation, claimed damages arising 
from the need to comply with state and federal land reclamation 
requirements and cultural protection measures involving the sacred sites of 
local indigenous people in the Californian desert.  A total of four amicus 
curiae briefs were filed by non-disputing parties, including two from 
environmental lobbyists, Friends of the Earth and a coalition of Sierra Club, 
Earthworks and the Western Mining Action Project;93 one from an industry 
  
 86. Letter from Methanex Corporation to the Tribunal, Oct. 31, 2003,  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexAgreementReScope.pdf 
(expressing disputing parties’ agreement on amicus participation). 
 87. Methanex, supra note 34, at part II, ch. C, ¶ 27, App. 5 (referring to the earlier 
Methanex Amicus Curiae Order 2001, supra note 79). 
 88. Savarese, supra note 73, at 102. 
 89. Methanex, supra note 34, at part II, ch. C, ¶¶ 26–30. 
 90. Id. part IV, ch. B, ¶ 27. 
 91. UPS, Inc. v. Canada, Final Award, 46 I.L.M. 922 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 
2007). 
 92. Glamis Gold, supra note 46. 
 93. Brief for Friends of the Earth Canada & Friends of the Earth United States as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Claimants, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 
Arb. Trib. 2009), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-
Amiccus-FOE-01B--30-09-05.pdf; Application of Non-Disputing Parties for Leave to File a 
Written Submission, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2009), 
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group, the National Mining Association;94 and one from the indigenous or 
first nations group, the Quechan Indian Nation,95 whose land and related 
cultural and religious rights were affected.  The amicus curiae brief from 
the Quechan Indian Nation argued for the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions in NAFTA in accordance with international law,96 relevant 
provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),97 the ILO Convention No. 69, concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries,98 and the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.99 
In seeking to balance issues of cultural heritage and environmental 
protection against the private property rights and the right of the host state 
to regulate, the Tribunal in Glamis Gold not only provided CSOs and the 
indigenous Quechan Nation with the opportunity to present their views 
through written amicus curiae submissions, but also fully articulated the 
guidelines contained in the NAFTA FTC Statement.100  Additionally, 
following a request from two sets of amici, the Tribunal made arrangements 
for public access to the oral hearings and facilitated the viewing by the 
Quechan Nation at a remote location of the “otherwise restricted discussion 
of tribal locations.”101 
A further point about the Glamis Gold award is that the Tribunal 
recognised the value of “significant involvement by non-disputing parties 
  
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USA-Amicius-
Sierra_Club_Earthworks-Application.pdf.  
 94. Submission of Non-Disputing Party National Mining Association, Glamis Gold, 
Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2009), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_glamis.htm. 
 95. Submission of Non-Disputing Party Quechan Indian Nation, Glamis Gold, Ltd. 
v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., 2009), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USA-Amicus-Quechan-01--19-
08-05.pdf [hereinafter First Quechan Indian Nation Amicus]; Supplemental Submission of 
Non-Disputing Party Quechuan Indian Nation, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., 2009), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/ 
Glamis-USA-Amicus-Quechan_Band-Submission_2/pdf [hereinafter Second Quechan 
Indian Nation Amicus]. 
 96. First Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 8–15.  
 97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 18, 27, Mar. 23, 1976, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; First Quechuan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 
95, at 8; Second Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 4. 
 98. ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, June 27, 1989, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm 
(adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Office at its 67th Session 
and entered into force Sept. 5, 1991); First Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 
10–12; Second Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 2–3. 
 99. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007); Second Quechan Indian Nation Amicus, supra note 95, at 
4, 6–7. 
 100. Glamis Gold, supra note 46, ¶¶ 268–74, 284–86. 
 101. Id. ¶ 290 (referencing Procedural Order No. 11, ¶15 (Jul. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis?Glamis-USA-Tribunal-Order_11.pdf). 
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and civil society, in general” and more particularly “the helpful involvement 
of the Quechan Nation in assisting both the Tribunal and the Parties in 
ensuring the confidentially of information concerning tribal lands.”102 
B. Non-Disputing Party Participation in ICSID Arbitration 
In the case of ICSID arbitration, there has been a similar development 
with respect to the growing recognition of amici in investment disputes, 
which has led to the introduction, and subsequent formal recognition, of 
amicus curiae briefs before ICSID tribunals.  Just as the initial impetus for 
change in Methanex and UPS came with the interpretation of Article 15 of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ICSID tribunals have turned to Article 
44 of the ICSID Convention,103 which grants a residual power to an ICSID 
tribunal to determine procedural issues.104 
Social and environmental concerns were first raised in 2003 before an 
ICSID tribunal by a group of amici in the case of Aguas del Tunari,105 to 
which I made reference in Section II.  However, the petition was dismissed 
by the Tribunal on the grounds that the “interplay of the ICSID Convention 
and the BIT, and the consensual nature of arbitration” left the core issue of 
such participation with the parties to the dispute.106 
A couple of years later the issue of non-disputing party participation 
arose again in two Argentinean water distribution and sewerage systems 
cases before ICSID tribunals.  Both tribunals followed the earlier 2001 
NAFTA decisions of Methanex and UPS and reversed the stand taken in 
2003 by the ICSID tribunal in Aguas del Tunari.  In Suez/Vivendi the 
Tribunal set out three conditions, upon which, five CSOs, representing 
  
 102. Id. ¶ 12, fn. 10(2). 
 103. ICSID, supra note 4, art. 44 (giving tribunals the discretionary power to decide 
upon any questions of procedure not covered in ICSID, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, or any 
rules agreed upon by the parties to the dispute). 
 104. Savarese, supra note 73, at 104; Suez, et al. v. Argentine Rep., ¶ 10, Order in 
Response to a Petition for Permission to make an Amicus Curiae Submission, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/19, (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2007) [hereinafter Suez/Vivendi Amicus Curiae Order]. 
 105. On August 29, 2002, a petition of La Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y 
Vida, La Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, SEMAPA 
Sur, Friends of the Earth-Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Fernandez, Father Luis Sánchez, 
and Congressman Jorge Alvarado was submitted on their behalf to the Tribunal by 
Earthjustice.  See James D. Wolfensohn, et al., Demanda de Participación Pública (Demand 
for Participation), Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, Case No. ARB/02/3 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 
2002), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CIADI_CARTA_DEAPOYO.pdf. 
 106. Aguas del Tunari, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 40, ¶ 17, in which the 
President of the Tribunal referred to a letter of Jan. 29, 2003, sent to the Earthjustice, on 
behalf of the petitioners denying their request for non-disputing party participation, including 
the right to submit an amicus curiae brief.  Id. app. III; see also Alexis Mourre, Are Amici 
Curiae the Proper Response to the Public’s Concerns on Transparency in Investment 
Arbitration? 5 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 257, 259 (2006). 
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environmental and consumer welfare concerns,107 would be considered as 
amici, although it denied them access to the arbitral hearings, which they had 
also requested.  The three conditions they had to meet were ‘‘appropriateness 
of the subject matter’’, ‘‘suitability of a . . . non-party to act as amicus curiae’’, 
and ‘‘the procedure by which the amicus submission is made and 
considered.’’108 
Based upon the evidence before it, the Tribunal took the view that the 
subject matter of the investment dispute was of “significant public interest 
since the underlying dispute relates to water and sewerage systems serving 
millions of people” and could raise “a variety of complex public and 
international law questions, including human rights considerations.”109  
Moreover, it was prepared to accept amicus submissions, but only from 
persons who could satisfy the Tribunal that they had “the expertise, 
experience, and independence to be of assistance” to it.110  In the end, the 
Tribunal denied the non-disputing parties’ request to attend the hearings and 
chose to defer a decision on their request for access to documents until such 
time as the Tribunal might grant a non-disputing party leave to file an 
amicus curiae brief.111 
In Suez/Interaguas,112 the Tribunal was faced with a similar request to 
that in Suez/Vivendi.  One CSO and three further individuals requested to be 
allowed to file amicus curiae briefs and to have access to the hearings.113  
But despite the Tribunal being composed of the same members as 
Suez/Vivendi, it reached a different conclusion.  While it laid down the same 
three conditions for the amici as it had done in Suez/Vivendi,114 it decided 
that the Petitioners had only met the first of the three conditions, i.e. the 
subject matter of the investment dispute was of significant public interest.  
However, on the second condition they had failed to provide “sufficient 
specific information and reasons to . . . qualify as amici curiae,” although it 
was pointed out that if they were to do so the Tribunal would be able to 
consider their request.115  
  
 107. Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ), Centro de Estudios Legales 
y Sociales (CELS),  Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Consumidores 
Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de 
Usuarios y Consumidores. 
 108. Suez/Vivendi Amicus Curiae Order, supra note 104, ¶ 17. 
 109. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. 
 110. Id. ¶ 24. 
 111. Id. ¶ 33. 
 112. Suez, et al. v. Argentine Rep., Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as 
Amicus Curiae ICSID, Case No. ARB/03/17 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2006), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0317-AC-en.pdf. 
 113. The Fundación para el Desarrollo Sustentable, as well as Professor Ricardo 
Ignacio Beltramino, Dr. Ana María Herren and Dr. Omar Darío Heffes, had all filed a 
petition seeking to participate in the hearings.  Id. 
 114. Id. ¶ 4.  
 115. Id. ¶ 34.  
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Meanwhile, a further stage in the enhanced recognition of non-party 
participation in investment arbitration came about against the backdrop of 
this second request in the Argentinean water and sewerage disputes.  In 
April 2006, ICSID updated its Arbitration Rules in order to allow non-
disputing parties to address environmental and other public policy issues of 
which an arbitral tribunal may not be adequately informed by either the 
claimant or the respondent. 
While Rule 32 was amended to permit “with the consent of the parties,” 
persons other than the parties to attend the arbitral hearings,116 the most 
significant change was to Rule 37.  A new second paragraph, dealing with 
“Visits and Inquiries,” stipulates: 
 
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is 
not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the ‘non-disputing party’) to file 
a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of 
the dispute.  In determining whether to allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall 
consider, among other things, the extent to which: 
 
 (a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing 
a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the 
disputing parties; 
 (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the 
scope of the dispute;  
 (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.117 
 
Moreover, the amended ICSID Arbitration Rule calls for “[t]he Tribunal 
. . . to ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the 
proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both 
parties are given an opportunity to present their observations on the non-
disputing party submission.”118 
At the end of 2006, the Petitioners in Suez/Vivendi requested permission 
to file one joint amicus curiae brief, due to the matters of public interest 
arising in the dispute, and to be allowed access to the arbitration 
documents.119  However, the Tribunal, in responding to the Petition, 120  
noted that the new ICSID Rule did not apply to these proceedings.  Instead, 
it followed the criteria that it had set out in its 2005 Order,121 which 
nonetheless were very close to those in the amended ICSID Rule.  Having 
  
 116. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 32(2); see also Savarese, supra note 
73, at 104–105. 
 117. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 37(2). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Suez/Vivendi Amicus Curiae Order, supra note 104, ¶ 7. 
 120. Id. ¶ 11. 
 121. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 
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determined that the CSOs in question fulfilled these criteria,122 the Tribunal 
considered that there was sufficient public interest in the outcome of the 
investment dispute to warrant the filing of an amicus curiae brief contrary 
to Claimant’s views.123  However, the Tribunal denied the Petitioners’ 
request for access to the record of the proceedings, noting that the new 
ICSID Rule did not provide any guidance on the matter.  They were also of 
the view that the amici already had a good deal of information about the 
case from other sources.124 
It was not until the case of Biwater Gauff v. United Republic of Tanzania 
that Rule 37(2) of the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules was finally applied 
by an ICSID tribunal.125  Following a number of skirmishes over 
transparency of the proceedings and access to pleadings and other 
documents, for which the Tribunal in Biwater Gauff issued Special Orders 
on Confidentiality, five CSOs126 were given leave to file one joint amicus 
curiae brief. 
The Tribunal’s Order on admission of amicus curiae briefs was handed 
down in February, 2007.127  In line with previous decisions, but more 
particularly the revised Rule 37 of ICSID Arbitration Rules, it allowed the 
submission of the joint amicus curiae brief on the grounds inter alia that it 
could potentially assist the Tribunal by providing a perspective or 
knowledge that was different from that of the disputing parties, and the 
petitioners demonstrated “sufficient interest” in the proceedings.128  It also 
noted that “allowing for the making of such submission by these entities in 
these proceedings is an important element in the overall discharge of the 
Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate and in securing wider confidence in the arbitral 
process itself.”129  However, the amici request for access to the 
documents,130 and to attend the hearings, was denied.131 
Furthermore, in issuing its Order, the Tribunal remarked on the relevance 
of the recent addition of Article 37(2) to the ICSID Rules and proceeded to 
apply it throughout.  It did, however, also acknowledge the decisions of the 
  
 122. Id. ¶ 16. 
 123. Id. ¶¶ 18–22.  
 124. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.  
 125. Savarese, supra note 73, at 105. 
 126. The Lawyers Environmental Action Team (“LEAT”), the Legal and Human 
Rights Centre (“LHRC”); the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (“TGNP”); the 
Center for International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (“IISD”).  Biwater Guff, supra note 43. 
 127. Biwater Gauff v. United Rep. of Tanzania, Procedural Order No. 5, (ICSID Arb. 
Trib. 2007) [hereinafter Biwater Gauff Procedure Order No. 5].  
 128. Id. ¶ 50. 
 129. Id. ¶ 62–68; see also Tienhaara, supra note 77 (providing a detailed overview of 
both the non-disputing party aspect and the relationship of that participation to broader issues 
of transparency and legitimacy in investment arbitration proceedings). 
 130. Biwater Gauff Procedural Order No. 5, supra note 127, ¶¶ 62–68. 
 131. Id. ¶ 69–72.  
2009] Bits and Pieces 55 
other two ICSID Tribunals in the Suez water and sewerage cases, who had 
employed similar terms and conditions for non-disputing party participation 
in the matter of amicus curiae briefs.132 
Noteworthy is the fact that, in their Petition,133 the amici in Biwater 
Gauff stressed the importance of investor responsibility,134 especially in the 
context of human rights (the right to water in this case)135 and sustainable 
development.136  They also emphasized the emerging issue of international 
corporate social responsibility (ICSR) in the sphere of investment, relying 
on certain international corporate and industry codes of conduct, which can 
be considered as “ethical standards” that serve as a “benchmark” against 
which TNCs may be judged.137  The inclusion of ICSR standards in BITs 
and other IIAs is an issue to which I return in Section IV below. 
C. Formalizing the Basis for Advancing Social and Environmental 
Justice Issues in Investment Treaties  
In the case of both NAFTA Chapter 11 and ICSID arbitration, we see a 
move from the mere noise of amici to a signal for governments to work pro-
actively towards the extension of non-disputing party rights and greater 
transparency in investment arbitration.  NAFTA and ICSID case law, an 
interpretative statement and an amendment to the rules governing arbitration 
respectively have brought about incremental changes in non-disputing party 
participation. 
However, this is not the end of the story.  Soon after the NAFTA FTC 
issued its Statement in 2003, both Canada and the United States revised 
their model BITs, in line with the trend towards the acceptance of amicus 
curiae briefs and greater transparency in proceedings, which had been 
signaled by some arbitral tribunals.  The Canadian Government had been a 
  
 132. Id. ¶ 52. 
 133. Brief for The Lawyers Environmental Action Team, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants, Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. United Rep. of Tanzania, Case No. 
ARB/05/22 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2007), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_ 
amicus_final_march_2007.pdf [hereinafter Biwater Gauff Amicus Curiae].  
 134. Id. ¶¶ 48–49 (making specific reference to the right to water as a human right).   
 135. Id.; see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General 
Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
 136. Likewise, the Biwater Gauff Joint Amicus Curiae Submission references the 
importance of environmentally sustainable safe drinking water.  Biwater Gauff Amicus 
Curiae, supra note 133, ¶¶ 45–46.  This finds support from the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), Goal #7 on Environmental Sustainability (Target 3 – safe 
drinking water) and is further supported by the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD).  See WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, THE 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2009 47 (2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/; World Summit on Sustainable Development [WSSD], 
http:www.un.org/events/wssd/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2009); World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development [WBSCD], http://wbscd.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
 137. Biwater Gauff Amicus Curiae, supra note 134, ¶¶ 52–53. 
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long-time supporter of non-disputing party participation in NAFTA Chapter 
11 disputes.  Not surprisingly its model FIPA of 2003 institutionalizes the 
role of amicus curiae submissions before arbitral tribunals in investment 
disputes.138  Article 39 of the Canada Model FIPA follows the text of the 
guidelines contained in the NAFTA FTC Statement almost to the letter,139 
although it points out that it is at the discretion of a tribunal to determine 
whether non-disputing parties have access to the proceedings on the basis of 
Article 38.140 
Since 2003, Canada has entered into a FIPA with Peru, which contains 
the language of Article 39.141  Moreover, the Government of Canada has 
recently concluded FIPAs with the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Latvia, Madagascar, Romania, and Slovakia, and is currently in 
negotiations with Bahrain, China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Poland, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, and Vietnam142 based on its model FIPA. 
Similarly, the U.S. Model BIT states at Article 28(3) that “[t]he tribunal 
shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions 
from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”143  This particular 
provision found its way into the U.S.-Uruguay BIT.144  It has also been 
included in U.S. free trade agreements (“FTAs”), which have investment 
chapters.  These include the U.S. FTAs with inter alia Singapore,145 
Chile,146 Morocco,147 and Oman,148 as well as the U.S.-Dominican 
  
 138. Tienhaara, supra note 77, at 232–233. 
 139.  Canada Model FIPA (2003), supra note 57, art. 39. 
 140. Id. art. 39(8) (referencing art. 38). 
 141. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 
2006, available at http:// www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_peru.pdf  
(entered into force June 29, 2007). 
 142. See Foreign Affairs & International Trade Canada, Canada’s Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (listing all of 
Canada’s FIPAs and current treaty negotiations); Tienhaara, supra note 77, at 233. 
 143. U.S. Model BIT (2004), supra note 56, art. XXVIII, ¶ 3. 
 144. U.S./Uruguay BIT 2005, supra note 63, art. XXVIII, ¶ 3. 
 145. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 15.19(3), May 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text (entered 
into force Jan. 1, 2004). 
 146. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 10.19(3), June 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 2004). 
 147. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 10.19(3), June 15, 2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text (entered 
into force Jan. 1, 2006). 
 148. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, art. 10.19(3), Jan. 19, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta/final-text (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 2009). 
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Republic/Central America,149 and its Trade Promotion Agreements 
(“TPAs”) with Colombia and Peru.150 
The draft Norwegian Model BIT states, in more expansive terms than its 
U.S. counterpart, that an arbitral tribunal hearing an investment dispute 
“shall have the authority to accept and consider written amicus curiae 
submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing Party, provided 
that the Tribunal has determined that they are directly relevant to the factual 
and legal issues under consideration.”151  Unlike, the U.S. Model BIT, the 
draft Norwegian Model BIT also provides that “[t]he Tribunal shall conduct 
hearings open to the public”152 as part of the commitment to transparency 
process surrounding the arbitral proceedings.  The right of parties to the 
dispute to request that the hearings be closed wholly or partially is, 
however, retained.153 
IV. EMBEDDING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
STANDARDS IN BITS: FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CORE 
In this Section, I turn my attention away from the substantive issues of 
social and environmental protection clauses in the regulation of foreign 
investment and procedural rights before investment arbitration tribunals to 
examine the  potential incorporation of so-called “international corporate 
social responsibility” (“ICSR”) standards in investment treaty instruments, 
such as BITs and other IIAs.  What could this mean for claims of social and 
environmental justice before investment arbitration tribunals?  It has been 
argued that ICSR obligations are “the quid pro quo for the protection of 
investors and investments under international investment protection 
agreements,”154 but they can be problematic. 
In discussing ICSR, there are some preliminary questions which need to 
be addressed, otherwise it may be difficult to realize the concept in practice.  
First, to what extent are multinational enterprises (“MNEs”), or 
  
 149. Dominican Republic-Central American States Free Trade Agreement, art. 
10.20(3), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text (entered into force 
Jan. 1, 2009).  The countries that are a party to this agreement include Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, and the United States.  Id.  
 150. Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., art. 10.20(3), Nov. 22, 2006, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-
text (not yet in force); Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text (entered into 
force Feb. 1, 2009).  A second, additional sentence in Art. 10.20(3) in both treaties calls for 
the proper identification of amicus curiae and details of any financial or other assistance they 
may have had in preparing their submission.  See Tienhaara, supra note 77, at 230, 233. 
 151. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra note 58, art. 18(3). 
 152. Id. art. 21(2). 
 153. Id.  
 154. See Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 16, at 643. 
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transnational corporations (“TNCs”), directly, or even indirectly, 
responsible for corporate wrongs? Where direct corporate responsibility is 
lacking, to what extent can governments in host states, where multinational 
corporations operate, be held accountable for their conduct? Second, can 
international human rights instruments impose duties on non-governmental 
entities in the private sphere? 
In answering these questions, various attempts have been made to try and 
hold TNCs or MNEs accountable for standards of minimum social and 
environmental protection in the jurisdictions in which they operate, but the 
problem is that most of those efforts are on a voluntary, non-binding basis.  
This is because soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, guidelines, 
declarations, and so forth are favoured for the regulation of ICSR in the 
field of foreign investment but may prove weak and ineffectual when it 
comes to enforcement. 
The issue is complicated by the fact that under international law, the 
state, rather than a corporation, is traditionally considered to be the bearer of 
responsibility for securing and enforcing fundamental human rights — 
many of which underpin social and environmental protection clauses.  
Where a TNC or MNE, which is operating overseas, acts in a manner that 
fails to uphold basic economic, social, and cultural rights, there is no legal 
redress for an individual against that corporation, except before the national 
courts of the host state.155 
A. Developments in International Corporate Social Responsibility 
Standards 
Notwithstanding this problem, there have been successive attempts over 
the past four decades to recognize a role for corporations to respect human 
rights, labour standards, and environmental protection in the conduct of 
their activities.  An early attempt to do just that is the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy of 1977.156  For example, in the matter of social policy with respect 
to employment, the ILO Tripartite Declaration aims to set out the principles 
in the field of employment; training; conditions of work and life; and 
industrial relations which governments, employers, and workers’ 
organisations and which multinational enterprises are recommended to 
observe on a voluntary basis.157  
  
 155. Vaughan Lowe, Corporations as International Actors and International Law 
Makers, 14 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 23, 26, 30 (2004). 
 156. ILO Tripartite Declaration 1977, supra note 7. 
 157. Id. at recital 7. 
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The ILO Tripartite Declaration takes, as its starting point, the 
international bill of rights,158 the ILO constitution, and the ILO fundamental 
principles of freedom of expression and association.159 The Declaration then 
calls upon Member governments of the ILO to ratify ILO Conventions 87, 
98, 111, 122, 138, and 182, if they have not yet done so, and to the greatest 
extent possible, through national policies.  Also, the Declaration calls for 
the Members to apply the principles embodied therein and in 
Recommendations 111, 119, 122, 146 and 190, which relate to freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, elimination of discrimination in 
employment and the prohibition of the worst forms of child labour and the 
prohibition on forced labour.160 
The revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 2000,161 
which form part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises,162 are intended to provide a set of voluntary 
principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with 
applicable laws.  One of their stated aims is to ensure a harmonious 
relationship between these enterprises and government policies in the 
jurisdictions in which they operate.  To that end, they should seek to 
strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between MNEs and the societies 
in which they operate.  Similarly, MNEs should also “help improve the 
foreign investment climate” and “enhance the contribution to sustainable 
development.”163 
The OECD Guidelines also contain general policy requirements with 
respect to economic and social rights as well as environmental protection, 
when they states that, “[e]nterprises should take fully into account 
established policies in the countries in which they operate, and consider the 
views of other stakeholders.  In this regard, enterprises should contribute to 
economic, social and environmental progress with a view to achieving 
sustainable development.”164 
However, this particular guideline does not make any specific reference 
to internationally recognised labour standards or relevant international 
environmental protection.  It is also purely voluntary and non-binding in 
  
 158. The International Bill of Rights consists of: the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948); the ICCPR, supra note 97; and the 
ICESCR, supra note 135. 
 159. ILO Tripartite Declaration 1977, supra note 7, recital 8. 
 160. These fundamental principles and rights at work have latterly been endorsed in 
the ILO Declaration 1998, supra note 62, which is considered to have declaratory force and 
currently acts as a minimum benchmark for the implementation of core labor rights around 
the globe. 
 161. OECD Guidelines 2000, supra note 8. 
 162. OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
June 26, 1976, http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,d in 1979, 1984, and 1991). 
 163. OECD Guidelines 2000, supra note 8, at 5. 
 164. Id. at 14. 
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nature and operates more by way of a set of recommendations to 
corporations and other business enterprises when investing overseas. 
In 1999, the former U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, challenged 
business leaders to abide by internationally recognised principles in the 
fields of human rights (two principles), labour (four principles — the core 
labour standards contained in the ILO Declaration 1998), the environment 
(three principles, including the precautionary principles), and anti-
corruption (one principle).  This call to arms was transformed into the UN 
Global Compact, which was officially launched in 2000,165 and is still 
ongoing. 
A different approach has been taken by the European Union when in 
January, 1999, the European Parliament passed a resolution on a code of 
conduct for European enterprises operating in developing countries.166  The 
resolution encouraged voluntary company codes of conduct “with effective 
and independent monitoring and verification, and stakeholder participation 
in the development, implementation, and monitoring of these codes.”167  It 
also recommended a model code of conduct for European businesses, which 
should consist of internationally recognised minimum standards in the 
matter of inter alia human rights, labour standards and environmental 
protection.168 
The original resolution also requested the European Commission to 
establish an independent body of experts to monitor and verify 
implementation of the code of conduct, to identify best practices, and to 
receive complaints about corporate conduct from interested parties.169  It 
was intended that, in monitoring the compliance of MNEs or TNCs, due 
attention should be paid to human rights norms and core labour standards. 
Finally, we should not forget the ongoing effort to provide a more tenable 
link between business and human rights generally, which is spearheaded by 
John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises.170 
    The earlier draft U.N. Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs,171 which were 
drawn up well before Ruggie embarked upon his mandate and preceded his 
work on the U.N. Framework,172 have been described as “a train wreck” by 
a developing country representative for the way in which they alienated 
  
 165. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 9. 
 166. Code of Conduct for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries,  
Res. A4-0508/98, 1999 O.J. (C104) 180. 
 167. Id. ¶ 1. 
 168. Id. ¶ 12. 
 169. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 17. 
 170. See Ruggie, U.N. Framework, supra note 6. 
  171. U.N. Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs, supra note 10. 
 172.  U.N. Framework, supra note 6. 
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various communities across the business and human rights divide.173  While 
the U.N. Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs are no longer in the picture, 
the ongoing work of John Ruggie within the U.N. Framework has gathered 
pace. There is now agreement among business, states and civil society on 
the content of the relationship of business to human rights, which is 
manifest in the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights. In 
operational terms, this translates into an emerging recognition that in order 
to discharge the responsibility to respect corporations must carry out due 
diligence.174 
B. Incorporating Corporate Social Responsibility into Legally 
Binding BITs     
What is significant about these various soft law approaches to ICSR is 
that they could be made to bite if incorporated into bilateral treaty 
instruments in order “to ensure the observance of higher standards 
throughout the network of countries in which an MNE operates.”175  The 
point is that, as Alex Wawryk explains, the incorporation of a code of 
conduct into a treaty can “create a legal basis for international 
administration and enforcement of the code” and the treaty format “formally 
binds the parties [to the treaty] to give effect to the code through good faith 
implementation and enforcement.”176  
In fact, the draft Norwegian Model BIT incorporates, by reference, an 
ICSR-style provision in Article 32, whereby “[p]arties agree to encourage 
investors to conduct their investment activities in compliance with the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises and to participate in the 
United Nations Global Compact.”177  While this text on corporate social 
responsibility was perceived by some CSOs as containing weak language,178 
the Norwegian Government defended its inclusion.  It did so on the grounds 
that the provision was primarily aimed at countries outside the OECD area, 
noting that some non-OECD countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
  
 173. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Opening Statement to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, June 5, 2008 (prepared by John Ruggie), available at 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-statement-mandate-review-5-Jun-2008.doc 
[hereinafter SRSG Opening Statement].  
 174. Ruggie, U.N. Framework, supra note 6, paras. 56-64. 
 175. SRSG Opening Statement, supra note 173. 
 176. Alex Wawryk, Regulating Transnational Corporations Through Corporate 
Codes of Conduct, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 56 (Jedrzej 
George Frynas & Scott Pegg eds., 2003). 
 177. Norwegian Model BIT (2007), supra note 58, at 24. 
 178. SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 58, at 12 (recommending that the text on corporate 
social responsibility be strengthened and calling for Norwegian investors to be held 
responsible for applying the U.N. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc.  TD/RBP/CONF/10 (May 
2, 1980) (adopted by G.A. Res. 35/63 (Dec. 5, 1980)).). 
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Slovakia had already committed themselves to such efforts, and it was 
trying to encourage Norwegian commerce and industry to respect the 
guidelines and report potential breaches.179  Subsequently, the Norwegian 
Government withdrew its draft Model BIT in June 2009, following 
widespread public criticism.180  The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
simultaneously took the unprecedented step of distributing an English-
language version of its ICSR policy.181 
Such national policy approaches may be the first step on the way to 
hardening up some of the soft ICSR standards found in a range of 
instruments, provided enough states follow in sufficient number to create a 
critical mass in support of such standards.  Those soft ICSR standards could 
eventually be made to resonate in the same way by being “incorporated” 
into BITs and other forms of IIAs. 
Similarly, the work of John Ruggie may lead to an embedding of 
international standards for corporations with respect to human rights, as part 
of their ICSR.  This could lead to a renewed emphasis on making these 
norms enforceable at the international level.182  If the latter exercise is 
successful — if only from a monitoring and verification point of view — a 
further aspect of the Special Representative’s work could be that of ICSR 
benchmarks for corporations and other business entities when investing 
overseas.  However, there are early indications that the future relationship of 
business and human rights could take on an altogether different character, 
based on due diligence requirements as defined in the UN Framework. 
Given that such putative forms of ICSR or even corporate due diligence 
requirements with respect to human rights may be difficult if not impossible 
to enforce, do host state governments risk a chilling effect by incorporating 
such clauses into their investment treaties?  What might be the reaction of 
foreign investors?  Will they welcome the inclusion of ICSR provisions in 
investment instruments designed for their protection but also to monitor 
their behaviour?  What are the potential business and reputational costs of 
doing this? 
Answers to some of these questions may, as Peter Muchlinski suggests, 
arise in the course of litigation.  It is entirely possible that where an investor 
claims that there has been a breach of a fundamental investor protection 
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standard or a property right in a BIT, the host State will respond by 
reference to the foreign investor’s corporate social responsibility as a 
justification for, either failing to comply with basic standards of ICSR, or as 
part of its regulatory reaction.183  It may well be that some investment 
arbitration tribunals will take the investor’s conduct into account in 
determining the nature of the host state’s response, but it is equally possible 
that arbitral tribunals will construe ICSR provisions narrowly or disregard 
them altogether due to their soft, “best efforts” language. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
On the balance of developments so far in the field of BITs and other 
IIAs, it is clear that there is a growing trend in investor-state relations 
towards balancing investor standards and protection of property rights 
against the right of a state to regulate in the matter of social and 
environmental protection.  Some of the more advanced third generation 
model BITs and other IIAs have begun to reflect these changes with the 
inclusion of specific social and environmental protection clauses and a non-
lowering of standards in such investment treaty instruments.  What is less 
appreciated perhaps is that this remains a difficult balancing act for many 
governments when negotiating BITs and other IIAs. 
The movement towards greater transparency in investor-state arbitration 
has been propelled by the active role of CSOs, seeking social and 
environmental justice in North American investment treaty practice, 
principally under NAFTA, which has been followed by similar action 
before ICSID tribunals.  These events have triggered important changes in 
the way some investment arbitration tribunals conduct their proceedings.  It 
has led to a greater recognition of non-disputing party participation, 
including the right to submit amicus curiae briefs on human rights, social, 
environmental, and cultural policy grounds, and, in some cases, to be 
permitted to attend the proceedings.  More significant is the fact that in 
practice this change has now been entrenched in some of the newer IIAs, 
which are based on the Canadian Model FIPA184 or the U.S. Model BIT.185 
However, greater acceptance of non-disputing party rights in 
international investment arbitration is not yet universal.  Despite the 
NAFTA FTC Statement of 2003186 and the amendment to ICSID Arbitration 
Rules in 2006,187 any investment arbitration, which is conducted strictly in 
accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules 1976,188 and which is not a 
NAFTA tribunal, does not offer the same non-disputing party rights.  In 
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fact, the UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration in February, 2008, 
rejected calls by many states and observer CSOs, such as IISD and CIEL, 
both of which have been active amici in a number of NAFTA Chapter 11 
and ICSID arbitral awards, to discuss the introduction of transparency 
requirements, including the submission of amicus curiae briefs, into 
international rules governing investor-state arbitration.189  Further attempts 
over the past year to advocate for more transparency in investor-state 
arbitration have continued in UNCITRAL Working Group II on Arbitration, 
including statements by John Ruggie to the UNCITRAL Commission on the 
matter,190 have yet to bear fruit. 
Finally, the move to try and develop social and environmental protection 
clauses in order to make them part of the broader panoply of ICSR 
standards, and to embed them in BITs and other IIAs, is just beginning.  
Yet, as the experience of Norway’s draft Model BIT191 demonstrates, there 
is a long way to go.  It seems that the world may not yet be ready for 
extensive inclusion of such ICSR standards, alongside enhanced social, 
environmental, and cultural protection, in investment treaty instruments. 
The question also arises as to the enforceability of these ICSR standards, 
even if taken up in BITs or other IIAs.  Nevertheless, once an investment 
arbitration tribunal reaches a decision in which it holds a foreign corporate 
investor to account on the basis of one or more of these standards, the spell 
will have been broken.  Such embedded ICSR standards could turn out to be 
the defining issue of investor-state relations in the decade to come. 
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